Irene Paul and Charles J. Paul v. Woodrow Lawrence Kirkendall : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Irene Paul and Charles J. Paul v. Woodrow
Lawrence Kirkendall : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Thatcher; Milo V. Olson;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Paul v. Kirkendall, No. 7957 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1912
Case No. 7957 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IRENE PAUL and CHARLES J. 
PAUL, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
'VOODRO'V LA "\VRENCE KIRIC-
ENDALL, 
Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
··- ·- Paul Thatcher of 
~ Young Thatcher & Glasmann 
- · Attorneys-at-law 
- 1\? "First Security Bank Building F 1 L f6 tg;len, Utah 
JUL- 2 kO~ilo V. Olson 
------------------Eu~~geles, California 
--------- .......... -~e Co\.ll't, u 
...cl .. rlc \:3Ut--r~ ...... 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ________________________________________________ I 
STATEMENT OF POINTS __________________________________ . _________ l9 
ARGUMENT --------------------------------------------------------~---------20 
Point 1. The points relied on and argued by the 
appellant, to-wit: ( 1) That the general 
damages awarded to Irene Paul are exces-
sive and (2) that the award of $5,000 to 
Charles J. Paul for loss of services of his 
wife is excessive, are insufficient in law to 
justify any relief to the Appellant, as no 
claim is made that they have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice ____ 20 
Point 2. On this appeal the judgment of the 
Trial Court is presumed correct, the burden 
of affirmatively showing error is on appel-
lant, the evidence and the inferences there-
from must be viewed in the light most favor-
able to the Respondents, and the ruling on 
the motion for new trial was largely within 
the trial court's sound discretion which will 
not lightly" be disturbed ____________________________________ 25 
Point 3. The damages awarded Irene Paul are 
not excessive nor do they appear to have 
been given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice _________________________________________ , ______________ 28 
Point 4. The damages awarded Charles J. Paul 
for loss of his wife's services are not exces-
sive nor do they appear to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice ____ 33 
Point 5. The decisions relied on by Appellant are 
not in point ________________________________________________________ 36 
CONCLUSION ----------------------------------------------------------------41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Court Decisions 
Ash vs. Mortenson 
24 Cal. 2nd 654, 657 
Page 
ISO Pac. 2nd 876 ____________________________________________________________ 29 
Brinck vs. Bradbury 
179 Cal. 376; 176 Pac. 690 ____________________________________________ 31 
Carballal vs. Pilgrim Laundry, Inc. 
5 N.Y. S. 2nd 38; 18 N. E. 2nd 44 < 1938) ___________________ _40 
Colonial Baking Company vs. Acquino 
103 S. W. 2nd 613 (Tennessee, 1936) ____________________ 37, 39 
Crawford vs. City of New York 
59 N. Y. S. 2nd 873 ________________________________________________________ 37 
Duffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company 
--Utah ; 218 Pac. 2nd 1080 _______ _24, 27,32 
Duncan vs. Branson 
110 Pac. 2nd 789 <Kansas, 1941) _______________________________ _40 
Edminister vs. Thorpe 
226 Pac. 2nd 353 ____________________________________________________________ 34 
Hamelin vs. Foulkes 
105 C. A. 458; 287 Pac. 526 ________________________________________ 31 
Keller vs. Wixom 
--Utah.--255 Pac. 2nd 118 ____________________________________________________________ 21 
Kimball vs. Northern Electric Company 
112 Pac. 153 ____________________________________________________________________ 22 
Leverich vs. Casden 300 N. Y. S. 762 ____________________________________________________________ 37 
Lovelandy vs. Sacramento City Lines 
102 C. A. 2nd 28; 226 Pac. 2nd 722 ____________________________ 30 
Lynch vs. Southern Pacific Co. 
24 C. A. 108; 140 Pac. 298 ___________________________________________ .31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
McLaughlin vs. Chief Consolidated Mining Company 
62 Utah 532; 220 Pac. 726 ____________________________________________ 26 
McNown vs. Pacific Freight Lines 
50 C. A. 2nd 221; 122 Pac. 2nd 582 ____________________________ 30 
Missouri Pacific Transportation Company vs. Socker 
138 S. W. 2nd 371 ( Arkansas, 1940) -------------------------------.40 
Mitchel vs. Arrowhead Freight Lines 
--Utah---
214 Pac. 2nd 620 ____________________________________________________________ 27 
O'Brian vs. J. I. Case Company 
2 N. W. 2nd 107 <Nebraska, Jan. 1942) _____________________ _40 
Palfreyman vs. Bates & Rogers 
Construction Company 
108 Utah 142; 158 Pac. 2nd 132, 133 
<Syllabus No. 2) and cases there cited _______________________ _26 
Pauly vs. McCarthy 
109 Utah 431 
184 Pac. 2nd 123 ___________________________________________________ _24, 32 
Pearson vs. Whitworth 
75 C. A. 2nd 751; 171 Pac. 2nd 745 ____________________________ 31 
Perry vs. City of San Diego 
80 C. A. 2nd 166; 181 Pac. 2nd 98 ________________________________ 30 
Perry vs. McLaughlin 
212 Cal. 1; 297 Pac. 554 ________________________________________________ 30 
Ravare vs. McCormick and Company 
166 Southern 183 (Louisiana, 1936) ________________________ 37 
Reilly vs. California Street Cable R. R. Co. 
76 C. A. 2nd 620; 173 Pac. 2nd 872 ____________________________ 31 
Roedder vs. Lindsley 
28 Cal. 2nd 820, 822-823 172 Pac. 2nd 353 ___________________________________________________________ _31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Saltas vs. Affleck 
99 Utah 381; 105 Pac. 2nd 176 ________________________________ 23, 27 
Sundberg vs. Ringel 
100 C. A. 545; 280 Pac. 557 ________________________________________ 30 
Thomas vs Southern Pacific Co. 
116 C. A. 126; 2 Pac. 2nd 544 ______________________________________ 30 
Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company 
--Utah--
239 Pac. 2nd 163 ____________________________________________________________ 26 
Walkenhorst vs. Kesler 
92 Utah 312 
67 Pac. 2nd 654 ____________________________________________________________ 23 
Werkman vs. Howard Zinc Corp., 
97 C. A. 2nd 418; 218 Pac. 2nd 43 ________________________________ 31 
Whittaker vs. Ferguson 
16 Utah 240; 51 Pac. 980 ____________________________________________ 24 
LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIAS CITED 
13 California Jurisprudence, 
Section 83, Page 897 ______________________________________________________ 34 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 75 (p)_ __________________ _l 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 (a) (5). ___________ 22 
Section 104-40-7, U. C. A., 1943 ________________________________________ 22 
Constitution of Utah Article VIII, Section 9 ____________________ 24 
MISCELLANEOUS 
California Book of Approved Jury lnstructions ___________ .4, 34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IRENE PAUL and CHARLES J. 
PAUL, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
vVOODROW LAWRENCE KIRK-
ENDALL, 
Appellant. 
STATEMEN"T OF FACTS 
Respondents disagree with the statement of facts 
of the Appellant. In fact the Appellant's purported 
statement of facts is so meager that it can hardly be 
characterized as a statement, and the Respondents doubt 
very much that it is sufficient to satisfy Rule 75{p) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In the course of 
Appellant's argument he quotes or paraphrases exten-
sively some of the testimony, particularly that portion 
which was favorable to him as if upon the erroneous 
theory that this court would consider the '"'"eight of the 
evidence in an appeal of this kind, but that clearly 
does not satisfy the rule. 
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In any event the Appellant's statement is so inade-
quate that we are constrained to restate the facts so 
that the matter Inay be considered by the Court as it 
should be considered. 
In this statement we will use the letter "T" to refer 
to the Transcript of Testimony and the letter "R" to 
refer to the balance of the Record, which is separately 
bound. 
Respondents agree that this is a suit for damages 
for personal injuries to Irene Paul resulting in general 
and special damages, and for damages to her husband 
Charles J. Paul for the loss of the services of his wife. 
At the opening of the trial the Appellant admitted 
his liability and admitted that both Respondents had 
suffered damages. He contested only the nature and 
extent of the damages. (T. 4-5). The issue of damages 
was tried to a jury and submitted under instructions to 
which neither party took any exception. The jury re-
turned a general verdict in the sum of $20,000 for the 
Respondents and judgment was entered thereon. (R. 
008 .and 009). At the same time the jury answered 
special interrogatories submitted by the Court assessing 
Irene Paul's general damages in the su1n of $11,800 and 
Charles J. Paul's damages in the sum of $5,000. The 
special medical expenses were stated to be in the sum 
of $3000 and the balance recoverable by the Respondents 
for property damage was fixed in accordance with the 
instruction of the Court (given on stipulation) at $200. 
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The .:\ppellant filed a motion for new trial upon 
the ground of '• excessive damages appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.'' 
There was added the ground of insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict, but this is now immaterial 
as only the excessive damage issue is presented in Appel-
lant's Brief. (R. 011). 
The motion for new trial was considered and denied 
by the trial court and this appeal followed. 
At the trial the following facts were presented in 
evidence: 
The Respondents are husband and wife, having been 
married in 1948. l\Irs. Paul is forty ( 40) years old. She 
has two sons, one ten years old, by a former marriage, 
and one two years and four months old at the date of 
the trial in November, 1952. (T. 7). Both children are a 
part of the household of the Respondents. 
The accident in question happened in San Fernando, 
California on April 29, 1951. In this accident Mrs. Paul 
sustained injuries to the lumbo-sacral joint of her lower 
spine which later forced her to submit to an operation for 
the fusion of this joint. She also suffered injuries to 
both of her ankles. She suffered tremendous pain, nerv-
ousness and anxiety and cont!nued to suffer even 
through the trial~ 
Inas1nuch as the accident happened in California, it 
was agreed by the parties (in accordance with law), 
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although it apparently does not appear fron1 the record, 
that the California law applies as to the substantive 
rights of the parties while as to all matters of pro-
cedure the Utah Law applies. It was understood that 
the Court be entitled to take judicial notice of the laws 
of California as of the laws of Utah, and the Court in 
instructing the jury based its instructions on the sub-
stantive law on the California Book of Approved Jury 
Instructions. 
For some months immediately prior to the accident 
Mrs. Paul had been in very good health. Prior to the 
accident she had been active, even athletic, and had 
played golf, bowled and ridden horseback with her 
husband, and owned her own horse. Previously she had 
done all her own housework. Eight (8) weeks after the 
birth of her second child on July 12, 1950, she had almost 
completely recovered from the birth and had returned 
to a normal manner of living. She made no complaints 
about her body and was able to do her own housework. 
She accompanied her husband on several fishing trips in 
the mountains and was riding horseback and bowling. 
( ~. 23, 293-294). 
Although she had a history of sinusitis attributed 
to allergy, had suffered recurrence of cystitis (an infec-
tion of the bladder) following childbirth or abdominal 
operations, had submitted to a uterine suspension for the 
purpose of enabling her to have children, had under-
gone an appendectomy, had suffered a number of mis-
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carriages and had because of these miscarriages sub-
mitted to an operation for the tying of her fallopian 
tubes following the birth of her second child, and had 
had chest or thoracic cag·e X-rays to check her lungs 
when she had a cold a little more than a week prior to 
rhe accident, those matters are obviously unrelated to 
the injuries she sustained in the accident and had cleared 
up before the accident. 
Her second son, as indicated, was born on July 12, 
1950. She had been in bed during eight months of her 
pregnancy and on getting back on her feet after this 
long confinement she had some trouble with backaches. 
This trouble, however, lasted only eight to ten weeks, 
at the most, after the birth of her son. It also caused 
some swelling of her ankles. ( T. 67-68). This back-
ache and swelling, however, did not interfere at all with 
her normal activity and her housework. (T. 294). Prior 
to the accident she drove an automobile and did sub-
stantially all of the family shopping. (T. 369). After 
the accident she was unable to drive the car or to do 
any shopping. ( T. 369, 271). 
It must be observed that the type of backache 
she had follo"\\ring the birth of her ehild was something 
that is normal and to be expected and was an entirely 
diffPrent kind of pain frorn the kind she had in her 
back following thes operation. Before the date of the 
accident she nev.:•r had a pain which was similar to the 
one she felt immediately after the accident and there-
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after and until after the operation. (T. 12, 16, 26 and 
68). She had never had any injury to her lower back 
prior to the accident of April 29, 1951. (T. 26). 
At the time of the accident Mr. Paul was driving 
the automobile and she was riding between him and 
her oldest son and carrying her younger son of\ her 
lap. The car was struck on the right front portion by 
the Appellant's car with such force that it was spun 
clear around and faced almost in the opposite direction. 
Mrs. Paul saw the approaching ear and braced herself 
and held her younger child firmly in an effort to pro-
tect him. She was violently thrown around in the car 
and ended up half on the front seat of the car and half 
on the floor boards in a semi-reclining position. She 
felt immediate pain in her lower back and in both ankles 
and was apparently in terrific pain, of which she com-
plained. When the police attempted to move one of 
her ankles she screamed and was left until an ambulance 
came with skilled attendants to move her. (T. 8 and 
276). She was taken to the San Fernando Hospital by 
ambulance. Her husband accompanied her there. Upon 
her arrival she was writhing in pain and had broken out 
in a cold sweat and was groaning and exclaiming about 
the pain in her back and tried to reach her back with 
her arms and was complaining about the pain in her 
ankles and abdomen. As the family physician was not 
available, she and her husband consented to being treated 
by Dr. Frank Pederson who happened to be at the ho~­
pital. (T. 279). He noted that she was in extreme pain 
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in her lmn'r ~pme, lumbar area, and both ankles. (T. 
78). He ordered a.sedative after which she quieted down 
somewhat. (T. 280). Dr. Pederson arranged to have 
~an ..S:-ray taken of :Mrs. Paul, Exhibit 5, to assist in his 
diagnosis. Her husband stayed for about one hour and 
a half and then left. Son1etime during that night Mrs. 
Paul was unable to empty her bladder and it was neces-
sary because of· the distention thereof to remove that 
pressure by means of catheterization. , ( T. 79-80). 
She was hospitalized for approximately two and 
a half day~ for relief of pain and X-rays taken to rule 
out possible fractures of the pelvis. 
Dr. Pederson finding no fractures gave accepted 
treatment for the condition he did find-salicylate, 
narcosis, diathermy and rest. She was then definitely 
suffering severe pain and also from shock resulting 
from the pain and the mental shock of the accident 
according to Dr. Pederson. (T. 81-82). She also had 
marked swelling of both ankles which Dr. Pederson found 
resulted from the tearing of the lateral deltoid ligaments 
of both ankles. It was his opinion that Mrs. Paul was 
definitely injured in the accident as far as her ankles 
and spine are concerned and his opinion would not be 
changed by history of ankle pain and swelling for several 
years prior. (T. 88). 
She was discharged two and a half days later 
showing moderate in1provement. (T. 86 and 283). When 
she left the hospital she was unable to move by herself 
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and was taken from her bed to the curb in a wheel-
chair and then Mr. Paul lifted her into the car and 
on arriving home put her to bed. (T. 282). She remained 
entirely in bed for about a week except as her husband 
took her to Dr. Pederson for treatment. After that 
with help fron1 others she tried to move about the house 
a little bit but was seated and resting as much as pos-
sible. She complained of pain every time she tried to 
move or anyone tried to move her. For about four 
weeks after she got out of bed she was unable to move 
at all without help and then she improved slightly 
and was able to move about a little bit on her own 
feet. (T. 283-284). It was apparent frmn the way she 
moved that she could not move normally. She was 
obviously in pain. (T. 285). Du:r;ing the month of 
June, 1951, she was still unable to move in a normal 
way or to sit or stand any length of time in any one 
position. She constantly complained of pain in her 
back. ( T. 286). In the forepart of July, 1951, she 
was sent with relatives who came to help her to a 
cabin in Big Bear, California to rest. This was done on 
the recommendation of her doctor. She stayed there 
over three weeks. ( T. 286-287). On her return her 
condition was not a bit improved. She was becoming 
increasingly nervous and tense. The pain had not sub-
sided. ( T. 287). In August, 1951, her condition was 
increasingly worse. She gave constant evidence of PX-
treme pain by her err a tic motion and by exclamations, 
indicating that her back was hurting her. Thereafter 
and until she saw Dr. Ho1ner Graham, an orthopedir 
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surgeon, there \Yere some days when her complaints were 
not so nurnerous, but for the most part she was increas-
ingly worse. Her husband, Charles J. Paul ,never ob-
served her to be free of pain at any time. ( T. 289). On 
September 4, 1951, she returned to Dr. Pederson asking 
additional help. He examined her and found the coccyx 
Yery tender to n1otion ,the tenderness extending out into 
the ligan1ents to the left, suggestive of tearing of the 
ligaments. This is normally caused by trauma. Prior 
to this Dr. Pederson had last seen her on May 7, 1951, 
\Vhen she was ''beginning to limber up'' but still haJ 
persistent severe pain over the lower left lumbar area 
and a persistent swelling of both ankles which were 
· still painful. On her return to Dr. Pederson on Septem-
ber 4, 1951, he found Mrs. Paul was also still suffering 
pain in the left lO\':er lumbar area, (T. 89), and she con-
stantly complained of a sore lumbar spine. (T. 90). 
Dr. Pederson prescribed corrective shoes for poor arches, 
weak ankles and scoliosis (or sideways bending) in her 
spine, thinking it would ease her pain. ( T. 52). As of that 
time Dr. Pederson testified that her back was a puzzle 
to him, but added, ''we do know that she must have had 
severe back injuries o,r a blow to have temporary paraly-
sis of her bladder," as he had found the night of the 
accident. (T. 101-102). 
From the first she followed Dr. Peterson's direc-
tions for treatment as much as possible. (T. 17). She 
tried to wear the corrective shoes that Dr. Pederson 
prescribed, but they caused her excruciating pain to 
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such an extent that on one occasion she passed out on 
the kitchen floor. She had never been known to faint 
before. (T. 52 and 370). 
Early in May she developed pain on urinating and 
was referred by her family physician to Dr. Winfield 
S. Herman, a urologist. He found she was suffering from 
cystitis and treated her for that. (T. 13-14, 164-165). Dr. 
Herman was of the opinion that it was a definite con-
nection between the accident resulting in the distentim1 
and catheterization and eystitis, because distention 
lessens resistance and catheterization occasionally intro-
duces infection no matter how much care is used. (T. 
168B). He was also of the opinion that there was no 
showing of a chronic .. cystitis existing at the time of the 
accident. (T. 179). 
Mrs. Paul's past urinary infections have alway~ 
followed an operation or serious illness in which she wa~ 
catheterized. (T. 184). Dr. Herman's examinations wen' 
very painful. As Appellant's counsel indicated in his 
questioning. they are about as painful an examination 
as any woman can undergo. ( T. 185). Mrs. Paul's 
regular physician, Dr. Willard Crosley, had attende\l 
her during her pregnancy, seeing her first for that cause 
on February 28, 1950. He saw her periodically until ~11,• 
was delivered of her child and noted that none of her 
complaints included any pain in her lower back. (T. 
192-193). He testified that the backaches she had in thl' 
course of her pregnancy and following were of the usual 
or normal type attending childbirth. (T. 210). 
10 
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As the conservative teabnent she had been given 
did not help her, ~Irs. Paul consulted her family physi-
cian, Dr. Crosley, and was by him referred to Dr. Homer 
Grahan1, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Graham is an ortho-
pedic specialist with a good reputation and record. (T. 
196). He examined her on Octiber 4, 1951 and obtained 
a history. His physical examination disclosed localized 
low back pain at the level of the lumbo-sacral joint. There 
was muscle spasm of the entire lumbo-sacral mass of 
muscles on either side. (T 116). He had X-rays of her 
back taken on October 16, 1951. (T. 218, Exhibit 7). 
He kept her under observation for more than a month 
and presecribed a brace which she wore while she was 
under observation. (T. 373-374). He consulted Dr. 
Joseph C. Risser, an orthopedic surgeon nationally 
known as a back specialist, (T. 220), and also Dr. Davi.d 
Eder, a neurosurgeon of Pasadena for consideration 
of a possibility of a ruptured disk or cord tumor or any 
other neurosurgical condition. (T. 220, 223). Dr Ri~­
ser reported that "the X-rays show, I feel, a fracture of 
the facet of the left side'' and Dr. Eder found no evi-
dence of a herniated disk. (T. 222-223). 
Finally as Mrs. Paul was not responding to con-
servative treatment but was gro-vving worse, and more 
nervous, apprehensi~.,e, anxious and tense, (T. 18 and 
271), Dr. Graham concluded that a spinal fusion of the 
lumbo-sacral point was necessary. He concluded that, 
even though there might be no fracture, injury to the 
joint required operation because the capsule in which 
II 
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the point was sheathed (which is generously supplied 
with sensory nerves) and the cartilage could have suf-
fered extensive damage and this does not repair normal-
ly. The replacing cartilage ordinarily does not wear well. 
This, with muscle spasm, which results in poor circula-
tion, causes the joint to deteriorate instead of improve. It 
digests itself. This is especially true with a nervous 
person of Mrs. Paul's type. (T. 288-229). Dr. Graham 
concluded that Mrs. Paul had sustained damage to the 
cartilage, the capsule and the ligaments about the lumbo-
sactal joint requiring the fusion operation. (T. 269). 
Finally on November 7, 1951, he performed this opera-
tion on Mrs. Paul because he had concluded that she had 
an injured lumbo-sacral joint which refused to respond 
to conservative treatment, and for the purpose of reliev-
ing her persistent pain. It is a common procedure to 
fuse a joint which causes severe and persistent pain 
in order to prevent further deterioration of the injured 
joint. (T. 228-229). Dr. Graham testified that it was his 
opinion that the injury for which he operated was caused 
by the accident and that the operation was necessary. 
(T. 232, 234). 
Mrs. Paul was absent from her hospital room for 
the purpose of the operation for some five hours. (T. 
291). 
This operation is a very major operation which is 
attended with considerable pain and suffering. (T. 103). 
Although Mrs. Paul frankly admitted that she 
12 
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was a nervous person and Dr. Pederson indicated he 
thought she had some psychosomatic overlay, Dr. Gra-
ham stated that in Mrs. Paul's case he did not think 
that the psycho-somatic overl¥y had any tendency to 
bring about an exag·geration of her symptoms. (T. 250). 
Moreover, he concluded that there was no malingering in 
this case, as counsel for the Appellant agreed. (T. 250). 
Dr. Graham testified that in' such operation he ex-
pects improvement for a period of one or two years but 
not after that. ( T. 234). 
Although 1\Irs. Paul's husband had never known 
her to show such symptoms before, after the a;ccident 
on April 29th and continually until the operation he 
was awakened quite often at night by her crying and 
by her grinding her teeth in her sleep. She was often 
awakened in a cold sweat from the pain and he would 
have to help her change her nightclothes. Except for a 
period of time in mid-summer she was unable to get 
aoout without assistance and when she visted Dr. Jones, 
the physician who examined her in behalf of the Appel~ 
lant on October 5, 1951, she was unable to walk without 
aid and he had to assist her. ( T. 366, 368, 372 and 379). 
During almost all of the time between the accident and 
the operation she was in extreme pain with night sweats, 
moaning and groaning and waking up nights. (T. 376). 
During this period of time there were many involuntary 
exclamations of pain such as rnoaning, groaning and 
nashing of teeth and quite often when she would step 
13 
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on an irregular place on a sidewalk or at the edge of the 
carpet she would exclaim involuntarily and show pain. 
( T. 372). During this time her husband had to assist 
her in getting in and out of bed. Usually when the pain 
wakened her at night and she would try to get up and 
walk she could not get in or out of bed without help. 
(T. 370). 
After the operation she was fifteen days in the 
hospital, then she returned home where she stayed 
in bed for better than four weeks. After she got up 
there was a period of convalescence when she was unable 
to do any of her duties. This continued until March 15, 
1952, when she resumed some of her household tasks. 
Since then her condition has improved rather rapidly. 
She still (at the time of the trial) had made some com-
plaints but of a different degree. (T. 291 to 293). 
Dr. Charles M. Swindler of Ogden who examined 
:Jfrs. Paul for the Appellant during the course of the 
trial noted that even then on November 19, 1952, more 
than a year after the accident her gait was still "some-
what guarded and protected." (T. 302). Dr. Swindler 
conceded that on the basis of the evidence furnished him 
he could not decide whether or not the fusion was 
necessary. (T. 339). Dr. George W. Jones, the other 
expert who examined Mrs. Paul for the Appellant, like-
wise refused to testify that the operation was not neces-
sary. ( T. 405). Apparently he recognized that only the 
physician in charge with all of the then circumstances 
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m mind could Inake a valid decision. (T. 339). Dr. 
Swindler also conceded that a fusion operation is prop-
erly done to eliminate pain and that if in the accident 
).frs. Paul had incurred an acute spinal flexion or bend-
ing, a fracture of the fa,cet would be likely and that there 
would have been an injury to the joint whether she had 
a fracture or not. (T. 355). 
Dr. Louis S. Peery, an orthopedic surgeon of 
Ogden, Utah, and a man of very high standing in his 
field, testified for the plaintiffs. (T. 117). He had 
examined the x-ray Exhibit 5 which was taken on the 
night of the accident, and additional x-rays were take11 
at the time of the trial under his direction. (Exhibits 11 
and 12 and T. 119-120). It was his considered opinion 
that the x-ray Exhibit 5 discloses a possible fracture at 
the edge of the facets in the lumbar area, and that the 
possible fratcure line shown in Exhibit 5 is not suggestive 
of a congenital anomaly because the line too ragged, and 
because the x-ray taken on October 16, 1951, just before 
the operation, shows a relatively less distinct line than 
the one taken immediately after the accident, indicating 
a healing of a fracture rather than a congenital anomaly. 
(T. 120, 129, 134-135). 
Dr. Peery further testified that the x-rays exhibits 
11 and 12 show a bone graft across the lumbo-'sacral 
joint, further secured by two screws, which eliminates 
the joint and the motion in that area. They show a fill-
ing in of the bone from the sacrum to the 5th lumbar 
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vertebrae and disclose an excellent fusion-a very suc-
cessfull operation. (T. 120-121). 
Dr. Peery also testified that the purpose of the 
fusion operation for the most part is to eliminate pain 
in the joint, as distinguished from correcting a fracture, 
and that the pain could come from traun1a to the joint 
even though there was no fracture. He conilllented that 
more fusions are done to eliminate pain than because of 
a fracture. (T. 121, 156). 
Dr. Peery also testified that he has reviewed the 
history of the case as it existed in October of 1951 im-
mediately prior to the operation and that under the 
circumstances then existing he would consider that "His 
hand w:ould be forced to do more than had been done up 
to that time. In other words, she had been given adequate 
conservative treatment, and it just didn't leave anything 
left to do in the way of conservaive treatment that would 
give her relief.'' ( T. 127). The scoliosis shown in he 
x-ray films indicates muscle spasm. Dr. Peery was of 
the opinion that at that stage the only alternatives ·were 
to do a fusion operation to remove the pain in the lumbo-
sacral joint or take the pain, which, as the other eviednce 
indicates, had become unbearable. (T. 128). 
Dr. Peery also testified that in the case of a frac-
tured bone the pain comes from the irrigation to the 
bone covering which is painful when stretched or torn, 
and commented that a sprain of the sacroiliac can be 
more severe than a fracture in the joint. (T. 133). 
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~1 rs. Paul was required to wear her back brace after 
the operation and continued to do so until March of 1952, 
when she was advised to leave it off ''whenever she 
could.'' This she has been doing, and at the time of the 
trial was able son1etimes to leave it off for as much as 
four or five hours, but not more. She was still having 
discomfort at each change of weather. (T. 374). 
In this connection we believe it is proper to note 
that during an extended trial the jury had great oppor-
tunity to observe Mrs. Paul's demeanor and gait and 
to see her move about the courtroom and ascend and 
descend the witness chair. It is believed that these per-
sonal observations which the jury very properly made 
undoubtedly indicated to the jury that Mrs. Paul was 
still suffering pain and great disability. In this connec-
tion Dr. Graham testified that Mrs. Paul may not be 
completely and forever free from her pain although he 
did believe she would ultimately be rehabilitated to the 
point where her disabilit~r would not be ''significant.'' 
(T. 234). That desirable goal has not yet been reached. 
About ten days before the trial she inadvertently stepped 
off a sn1all rise in the pavement and exclaimed very 
loudly indicating pain and thereafter spent two or three 
days in bed Kith a very sore back. Even during the 
trial her husband had to put hot packs on her back 
in order to limber her up so she could get out of bed. 
(T. 273). 
Although l\J rs. Paul had previously cared for her 
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children, done the fatnily shopping and done all of the 
housework for her family, after the accident she was no 
longer able to do any of that and at the time of the 
trial she was still unable to do any of the heavy work. 
She is still unable to care for her children and she still 
has to have help with her housework and is· unable to 
clean windows or do any of the heavier work at all. (T. 
23-24, 368). Although prior to the accident they had 
no help in the home, (T. 368), since then they have 
had to have help constantly and Mr. Paul has had to 
assist. He has t_aken care of them evenings and week-
ends while they have hired help for them in the daytime. 
(T. 368). The same situation has occurred as to the 
cooking: they have had hired help in t~e daytime and 
Mr. Paul did it on weekends and at night. This situation 
as to the cooking continued until March of 1952. (T. 
369). As to the shopping, after the accident Mr. Paul 
has had to do all of the shopping except a little recently. 
(T. 369). Mrs. Paul is no longer able to drive an auto-
mobile at all. (T. 371). As a result, in the early part 
of her illness when their oldest boy was required to go 
frequently to the dentist for treatment, Mr. Paul had to 
leave his business thirty miles away and take his oldest 
boy to the dentist, which took up a half day's time once 
a week for eight or nine weeks. (T. 372). 
The accident obviously has entirely disrupted the 
normal home life of the parties and as a result thereof 
Mr. Paul has been deprived of his \\'ife 's very valuable 
services for a long time and equally obviously will not 
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receive the cmuplete service he did previously for some 
time to come. 
This stateinent, it is believed, summarizes fairly the 
facts which were submitted to the jury and upon which 
the jury based its verdict of $20,000. In this connection 
it should be said that although there were undisputed 
damages established by stipulation to an amount exceed-
ing $3,500, the jury in its interrogatories assessed these 
special damages at only $3,000. 
STATE~1:ENT OF POINTS 
Point 1. The points relied on and argued by the Appellant, 
To-wit: (1) That the general damages awarded to Irene Paul 
are excessive, and (2) that the award of $5,000 to Charles J. Paul 
for loss of services of his wife is excessive, are insufficient in 
law to justify any relief to the Appellant, as no claim is made 
that they have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
Point 2. On this appeal the judgment of the Trial Court 
is presumed correct, the burden of affirmatively showing error 
is on Appellant, the evidence and the inferences therefrom must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the Respondents, and 
the ruling on the motion for new trial was largely within the 
trial court's sound discretion which will not lightly be disturbed. 
Point 3. The damages awarded Irene Paul are not excessive 
nor do they appear to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
Point 4. The damages awarded Charles J. Paul for loss 
of his wife's services are not excessive nor do they appear to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
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. Point 5. The decisions relied on by Appellant are not in 
point. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The points relied on and argued by the Appellant, 
to-wit; (1) That the general damages awarded to Irene Paul 
are excessive and (2) that the award of $5,000 to Charles J. 
Paul for loss of services of his wife is excessive, are insufficient 
in law to justify any relief to the Appellant, as no claim is made 
that they have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
The Appellant argues only two points in his brief. 
First, "that the general damages awarded to Irene 
Paul are excessive," and second "that the award of 
$5,000 to Charles J. Paul for loss of services of his 
wife is excessive." See Appellant's brief, Pages 2 and 
31. It is true that on page 2 of the brief under the head-
ing Statement of Points, it is stated that the special 
damages of $3,000 are excessive. However, the only 
argument on this point is on Page 31 under the heading 
of :f1lint 2 where it is said "with respect to the special 
damages awarded, these also seem e~cessive. It is true 
that Mrs. Paul received care in her home and while shi~ 
had a nurse, most of the care given to her was by her 
own relatives or the relatives of Mr. Paul.'' The Appel-
lant then lists some of the items of special damage but 
eliminates entirely the doctors' fees, the hospital bills 
and the medical bills, although there was ample evidence, 
and he does not contend that there was not ample evi-
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dence, to support this. In fact substantially all of the 
special da1nages were stipulated and they totaled more 
than $3,500, of which the jury only awarded $3,000. 
Obviously this point and the argument devoted t,) 
it are insufficient to require the court to search the rec-
ord to demonstrate an absence of evidence which he does 
not even bother to assert, and it is apparent that this 
point could not have been made in good faith for the 
purpose of being relied upon. The case of 
Keller vs. Wixom, 
---------- Utah ·---------
255 Pac. 2nd 118, 
decided by this court on Mar.ch 31st of this year see~s 
to be in point here. 
In any event Appellant dpes not, either in his state-
ment of points or in his argument claim that the damages 
aprpear ''to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice.'' The granting of a new trial is, 
of course, a procedural n1a tter. and must be governed 
by Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appellant 
does refer, in passing, to the fact that some of the 
nursing services included were rendered by relatives of 
Mr. and Mrs. Paul. The pecuniary obligation to pay 
these relatives was supported by direct and positive 
evidence. It is wholly immaterial that some of the 
nursing care was rendered by relatives of the Respond-
ents. It was so held by the California Court in 
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Kimball vs. Northern Electric Company, 
112 Pac. 153. 
Rule 59(a) (5) deals with the granting of a new 
trial upon the ground of excessive damages and say~ 
that the Trial Court may grant a new trial for ''excessive 
or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice.'' The Rule 
does not authorize a new trial merely because the court 
itself deems the damages excessive, but in addition to 
the excessiveness of the damages it must be made to 
appear that they "have been given under the influence 
of passion or prepudice. '' Our Rule, as the Court 
knows, is taken from our previous statute, Section 104-
40-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. It is firmly established 
under this statute and the rule which is taken from it 
that the granting of a new trial or the requiring of a 
remission of part of the damages awarded by a jury 
is proper only where the jury is clearly shown to han~ 
totally mistaken or disregarded rules of law for regula-
tion of damages or wholly misconceived or disregarded 
all evidence and thereby committed gross and palpable 
error by rendering a verdict so enormous, outrageous or 
unjust as to be attributable ot neither the court's instruc-
tions nor the evidence, but only to the jury's passion 
or prejudice. 
Moreover, it is equally well established that mere 
excessiveness of the jury's verdict does not necessarily 
~how that it was arrived at by passion or prejudice, ~~ 
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is required to authorize the Supreme Court to overrule 
the Trial Court's discretion as to the granting of a 
new trial or in the alternative the reinission of damageB, 
and the mere fact that the jury awarded more damages 
than another or the court n1ight have given or more than 
the evidence justified, does not conclusively show that 
the verdict was the result of the jury's passion o.r pre-
judice as is required to authorize the court to intervene 
and take from the jury its constitutional function as 
the trier of the facts in a law case such as this. It 
is also established that the jury has great latitude in 
assessing damages for personal injuries unless the ex-
cessiveness of the verdict can be determined as a 
matter of law, which is not the case here. Before the 
court can intervene in a matter of dmnages, the verdict 
must be so excessive as to shock one's conscience and 
clearly indicate passion, prejudice or caprice of the jury 
as a matter of law. As above noted, mere excessiveness 
of the verdict without more does not necessarily show 
such passion or P,rejudice. 
The above principles are firmly established in this 
jurisdiction by the following decisions of this court: 
Saltas vs. Affleck, 
99 Utah 381, 
105 Pac. 2nd 176; 
Walkenhorst vs. Kesler, 
92 Utah 312, 
67 Pac. 2nd 654; 
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and 
Pauly vs. McCarthy, 
109 utah 431, 
184 Pac. 2nd 123 
Duffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
---------- Utah ----------
218 Pac. 2nd 1080. 
This rule necessarily follows from the provisions of 
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution of Utah, 
which provides that in cases at law the appeal to this 
court shall be on questions of law alone so that this court 
cannot interfere unless the error of the jury is made to 
appear as a matter of law. See 
"Whittaker vs. Ferguson, 
16 Utah 240, 
51 Pac. 980. 
In the case norw at bar the Appellant makes no con-
tention that the verdict of the jury resulted from its 
passion or prejudice and indeed there is nothing in the 
record to indicate such passion or prejudice directed 
against the Appellant. If there is anything in the 
record in this regard, it would be the failure of the 
jury to find the full amount of the special damages in 
excess of $3,500 after it was stipulated that all of the 
charges for medical, surgical, hospital and nursing 
services had been incurred and that the charges were 
reasonable, and this prejudice, if any, was directed 
against the Respondents', not the Appellant's, case. 
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Moreover, the Appellant here makes no claim what-
soever in his brief that the verdict is so excessive, as to 
shock one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, pre 
judice or caprice so that passion and prejudice could 
be inferred a~ a nmtter of law, if indeed passion and 
prejudice can ever be inferred as a matter of law. The 
Appellant Inerely states plaintively that he now finds 
the burden of his admitted fault to be excessive and re-
quests the court to relieve him of it. This under the 
Constitution, the Rules of Procedure and the decisions 
of this court, the court cannot and should not do. Even 
if all the assertions and claims made by Appellant in 
his brief were taken as true (as they are not), still it 
would not justify this cou.rt in ordering a new trial or 
forcing the Respondents to remit any part of the dam-
ages. Appellant's contentions fail as a matter of law 
and this alone should determine this case so that the 
court would not be burdened with consideration of the 
other points involved. 
Point 2. On this appeal the judgment of the Trial Court 
is presumed correct, the burden of affirmatively showing error 
is on Appellant, the evidence and the inferences therefrom must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the Respondents, and 
the ruling on the motion for- new trial was largely within the 
trial court's sound disc1·etion which will not lightly be disturbed. 
The decisions of this court have long since settled 
beyond any peradventure of a doubt that there is a pre-
sumption that the judgment of the Trial Court was cor-
rect and that every reasonable intendment must be 
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indulged in favor of it, and that the burden of affirma-
tively showing error is ~n the Appellant. 
Palfreyman vs. Bates & Rogers 
Construction Company, 
108 Utah 142, 158 Pac. 2nd 132, 133 
(Syllabus No.2) and cases there cited. 
Moreover, on appeal fron1 a judgment on a verdict 
in the plaintiffs' favor the plaintiffs are entitled to have 
this court consider all of the evidence and every infer-
ence and intendment fairly arising therefrom in the 
light most favorable to them. 
and 
Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 
----------Utah----------
239 Pac. 2nd 163, 
McLaughlin vs. Chief Consolidated 
Mining Company, 
62 Utah 532, 
220 Pac. 726. 
Moreover, the question of whether a new trial should 
be granted on the ground of an excessive award of dam-
ages under the influence of passion or prejudice rests 
largely within the Trial Court's sound discretion and 
the Supreme Court is reluctant and slow to interfere 
with the Trial Court's exercise of that discretion in 
refusing a new trial on questions relating to damages. 
See 
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Caae No. 7957 
IRENE PAUL, et al., Respondents vs. WOODROW 
LAWRENCE KIRKENDALL, Appellant 
ADDI'.riOH '1'0 RESPOHDEN'.rS 1 BRIEF FOR BENEFIT 
OP RESPONDENTS IRENE PAUL AND CHARLES J. PAUL. 
Immediately following the citations on Pase 27 insert the following: 
See also: 
Geary vs • C&in 
69 tJtah 340 
255 Pac. 416, 
commenting that the trial court is in a much 
better position than the appellate court to 
observe and determine Whether a jury was 
actuated by passion or prejudice. 
The recent and as yet unpublished decisions 
ot this court in 
and. 
Wheat vs. The Denver and 
Rio Grande Weste:r,.n Railroad Co. 
Mo. 783B 
Lodder vs. Western Pacific 
Railroad Company, Mo. 7809, 
further emphasize that the Judgment or the 
trial court in cases auch as this should be 
tollond. 
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and 
Mitchel vs. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 
---------- u fah ----------
214 Pac. 2nd 620; 
Duffy vs. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, supra 
Saltas vs. Mfleck, supra. 
These well established principles should be equally 
determinative of the question here and determinative in 
Rspondents' favor. The Appellant in his brief nowhere 
contends that the Tr-ial Court in this case abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial on the 
ground of excessive damages. He merely reiterates that 
the damages are excessive and it is submitted the asser-
tion gains no force from the reiteration. As we will at-
tempt hereafter to demonstrate, there is ample evidence 
to justify the size of the verdict and to support the Trial 
Court's exercise of his discretion. In fact, we are again 
impressed with the fact that this is a strang~ case in 
which the Appellant admits that he is at fault and that 
the Respondents suffered damages and then, when the~ 
jury assesses the amount, he asks for a reversal of the 
Trial Court's order affirming the verdict without even 
cla·iming that the Trial Co-urt in so doing abused the dis-
cretion with 'll'hich he was vested. If any presumption 
whatever is indulged in favor of the Trial Court's ruling, 
it must in this case be affirn1ed. 
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Point 3. The damages awarded Irene Paul are not excessive 
nor do they appear to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
After reviewing the facts in this case it would seem 
that little argument need be devoted to the proposition 
that the amount of the award of general damages to 
Mrs. Paul was definitely not excessive either as a matter 
of fact or of law, but that on the contrary, if anything, 
it was inadequate. There is ample evidence in the record 
from which the jury could, as it did, conclude that all 
of the pain, inconvenience, suffering and disability which 
Mrs. Paul suffered after the accident and up to and 
beyond the date of the trial resulted from the accident 
for which the Appellant acknowledged liability. In fact 
the Appellant does not contend in this court that the 
evidence did not support the verdict, but only that dam-
ages were excessive. Appellant's own expert, Dr. Jones, 
concluded that she was totally disabled as a result of 
the accident for nine weeks thereafter. (R. 393). Mrs. 
Paul obviously suffered excruciating agony for two 
1nonths after her accident and then although the severe 
pain subsided somewhat and was somewhat quiescent 
during July, her condition became increasingly worse 
from August until the, time of her operation. After this 
very necessary operation she again was totally disabled 
for a period of months and again suffered excruciating 
agony to the extent that she became terribly nervous. 
She was totally disabled until I\Iarch of 1952 and is 
still partially disabled and very apparently "ill be di~-
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abled for a long ti1ne into the future. She is still suf-
fering pain and 1nisery as the result of the accident. 
Everybody is agreed that she really suffered very severe 
pain and that her condition was unendurable before the 
operation. Everybody is agreed that the operation is 
a dangerous one, characterized as ''major,'' and causing 
great suffering. 
Mrs. Paul certainly used due diligence and care in 
obtaining and selecting doctors and she cooperated in 
all of the treatment ·which was prescribed for her. 
During the trial the Appellant seemed to be striving for 
proof that the operation from which additional suffering 
proceeded was not made necessary by the accident and 
that Dr. Graham, vYho prescribed and performed it, had 
made an error in judgment, but his own experts refuse 
to back him up in that. !1oreover, whether the operation 
was actually necessary or not is immaterial so long as 
the Respondent exercised due care in the selection of her 
doctors. It is not here contended that she did not use 
such care. This is the law in the State of California, 
which is controlling on this problem of substantive right. 
See 
Ash vs. Mortenson, 
24 Cal. 2nd 654, 657 ; 
150 Pac. 2nd 876. 
We believe it to be equally the law in Utah. 
Moreover, on this last point the court in its Instrue-
tion No. 13 charged the jury that if Mrs. Paul has used 
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reasonable diligence in securing the services of a com-
petent medical doctor, giYen the doctor all clinical hi8-
tory of herself that is material and submits to his exami-
nation and follows the treatments prescribed, she can-
not be charged with the negligence, poor judgment or 
malpractice, if any, of her doctor. (T. 421). Inasmuch 
as this statement of the law by the Trial Court to the 
jury is not attacked in this court it has become the law 
of the case and is binding upon the Appellant. The 
jury's implied finding that Mrs. Paul did exercise due 
care in selecting her doctors is amply supported by the 
evidence. 
The Courts of California have in many cases held 
that under comparable circumstances similar awards are 
not excessive. See 
Thomas vs. Southern Pacific Co., 
116 C.A. 126; 2 Pac. 2nd 544; 
Perry vs. McLauglin, 
212 Cal. 1; 297 Pac. 554; 
Sundberg vs. Ringel, 
100 C.A. 545; 280 Pac. 557; 
MeN own vs. Pacific Freight Lines, 
50 C.A. 2nd 221; 122 Pac. 2nd 582; 
Lovelandy vs. Sacramento City Lines, 
102 C.A. 2nd 28; 226 Pac. 2nd 722; 
Perry .vs. City of San Diego, 
80 C.A. 2nd 166; 181 Pac. 2nd 98; 
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Roedder vs. Lindsley, 
28 Cal. 2nd 820; 822-823; 17:2 Pac. 2nd 353; 
Brinck vs. Bradbury, 
179 Cal. 376; 17'6 Pac. 690; 
Lynch vs. Southern Pacific Co., 
24 C.A. 108; 140 Pac. 298; 
Hamelin vs. Foulkes, 
105 C.A. 458; 287 Pac. 526; 
Pearson vs. "Whitworth, 
75 C.A. 2n<;l 751; 171 Pac. 2nd 7 45; 
Reilly vs. California Street Cable R .R. Co., 
76 C.A. 2nd 620; 173 Pac. 2nd 872; 
W erkman vs. Howard Zink Corp., 
97 C.A. 2nd 418 ; 218 Pac. 2nd 43. 
The jury who saw ~Irs. Paul through four long days 
of trial and saw her obviously good faith efforts to con-
ceal rather than exaggerate her disability as she moved 
about the court room, and who personally observed her 
demeanor and that of her husband in describing her 
injuries and disabilities and the pain she suffered, are 
certainly best qualified to measure the extent of her 
past and probable future damages resulting from the 
accident. Certainly this court frmn a cold record should 
not try to say that $11,800 was so grossly and mani-
festly excessive as to shock the conscience and clearly 
indicate passion and prejudice. In this case no one has 
even contended that :Mrs. Paul's agony or disability 
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were not real, and surely no one can in good conscience 
say that, for this agony and this severe disability of her 
back which destroys all certainty and stability and ease 
of movement, the sum awarded her for past and future 
pain, suffering, anxiety, mental anguish, inconvenience 
and physical disability was at all excessive, especially in 
view of the present inflated value of the dollar. Who 
would say that this verdict even fairly compensated her 
for her injuries and suffering~ If so, that one for some 
additional sum should fairly be willing to undergo simi-
lar injuries, suffering and disability for: $12,000,000 for 
that would mean a $200.00 profit on the transaction. 
Manifestly no one whether a reasonable prudent man 
or an unreasonable or imprudent man, would do that. 
Actually this verdict, if the jury erred at all, was 
too modest, for the evidence would have justified a 
much larger verdict. 
In this connection it may be properly noted that 
under the law the present diminished purchasing power 
of the dollar may be considered when estimating dam-
ages. See 
and 
Duffy vs. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, supra, 
Pauly vs. McCarthy, supra. 
Actually Mrs. Paul is only getting a verdict of approxi-
mately $7,000.00 in uninflated currency. 
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The Trial Court n1anifestly did not abuse its dis-
cretion in refusing to order a new trial or a remission vf 
damages in this case and the judgment must be affirmed. 
Point 4,. The damages awarded Charles J. Paul for loss 
of his wife's services are not excessive nor do they appear to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
The court in accordance with the. California Law, 
which we believe to be consistent with the Utah 
Law, instructed the jury that if they found that Mr. 
Paul was entitled to recover damages, they should award 
to him ''a sum that will cmnpensate him reasonably for 
any loss of his "Tife 's services which he has suffered, or 
is reasonably certain to suffer in the future as a proxi-
mate result of the accident in question.'' The Court 
further instructed the jury in effect that they should 
fix the present pecuniary value of both past and future 
services thus lost and to that end should consider the 
character and condition of the home o-f the parties, the 
services that have been performed by the wife in the 
management of the household, the fact that there have 
been children in the home and the character of the wife's 
services, the extent to which any work connected with 
the management of the home has been done by other 
than the wife and the nature, extent and value of any 
services of an advisory character although not involVing 
any manual labor or physical skill which have been per-
formed by the wife for the husband. The jury were 
further instructed that the services rendered by a \vife 
to her husband's benefit may be and often are of such 
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character that no witness can say what they are worth. 
Often they have no rnarket value equivalent and hence 
it is not necessary that there be any direct or express 
testimony as to the value of a wife's services to entitle 
her husband to recover therefor. The court instructed the 
jury that the relationship the wife sustains to her hus-
band is a special and peculiar one and the actual facts 
of the case at hand considered in the light of their own 
experience and to the satisfaction of their own con-
sciences must guide them in estimating the husband's 
pecuniary loss. The Court properly added, under the 
California Rule, that the law does not permit any award 
simply for the loss of a wife's society or the comfort and 
emotional values of her companionship. (Instruction No. 
9, T. 417-418). These instruction were taken from the 
California Book of Approved Jury Instructions and 
clearly state the law in California. See 
Edminister vs. Thorpe, 
226 Pac. 2nd 353. 
In that case the husband was awarded $4,000.00 for the 
loss of services of his wife injured in an automobile ~wei­
dent. The court there quoted with approval from n 
California Jurisprudence, Section 83, Page 897 as fol-
lows: 
''Consequential damages to the husband 
include loss of services of the wife .... damages 
for loss of services of the wife are recoverable, 
though there is no direct proof of the vahw of 
such services.'' 
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'Vho is there who would say that the substantially total 
loss of the wife's services from the end of April in one 
year until sometime in March of the following year, 
with very strictly fu.nited services for some uncertain 
time in the future, and possibly a p.ermanent loss of her 
services, would not be \Yorth $5,000 ~ True it is, as the 
Appellant points out, that some of the services, princi-
pally the caring for the children and the cooking of 
the family Ineals during the daytime, was done by hired 
help, the cost of which was partly and only partly com-
pensated by the verdict for such damages, but are a wife's 
services to the family at night of no value, especially 
where there is a s1nall baby~ And are the wife's serv-
ices as a shopper of no value~ And what of the serv-
ices she had previously rendered to Mr. Paul which he 
had himself to take care of at night and over weekends 
as he testified 1 Moreover, as the Trial Court instructed 
the jury, the wife's services are of a special nature, and 
who is willing to say that hired help will adequately re-
place a loving, careful and intelligent mother in the 
care and training of Respondents' children~ 
Those of us among the men in our society who have 
had occasion to try to substitute for our. wives or mothers 
in cases of an en1ergency will have a better idea than 
Appellant of the true value of the services of a wife to 
her husband in caring for the children, in managing and 
running the home, and, in general, the managing and 
organizing and performing all the multitudinous tasks 
which a housewife and uwther must perform. As the 
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Trial Court very properly instructed the jury, it is 
very difficult to place a pecuniary value on such services. 
The services a wife and mother render, like personal 
injuries and suffering and anguish, cannot really be 
valued in dollars in view of their special nature. 
It is submitted that no fair and reasonable man can 
conscientiously say that an award of $5,000 to Mr. Paul 
for the loss of his wife's peculiar and personal services 
in the management of his home and family is at all 
excessive, not to mention its being so excessive as to 
shock the conscience or disclose passion and prejudice 
as a matter of law. It seems eminently fair and just 
and the Trial Court did not abuse his discretion in refus-
ing to order a new trial because of this award. 
Point 5. The decisions relied on by Appellant are not in 
point. 
Perhaps some brief analysis of the decisions relied 
on by Appellant will be helpful to the Court. 
It must first be observed that none of the authorities 
cited hy the Appellant come from either California or 
Utah and hence are not in any sense binding upon the 
Court. 
Moreover, all are distinguishable so that they are 
not even persuasive. The cases fall into several groups 
which we shall try to consider in turn. 
First, several of the dP<'i:-;ion:-; are either memoran-
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dum decisions or very brief opinions which contain no 
discussion whatsoever of the nature or extent of the 
injuries or lost services involved. As a result they 
cannot help us either way. These cases include 
and 
Crawford vs. City of New York, 
59 N.Y.S. 2nd 873, 
Leverich vs. Casden, 
300 N.Y.S. 762. 
Second, we have two cases where the Appellate 
Courts refused to disturb the Trial Court's exercise of 
its discretion in fixing the danmges and hence are 
obviously of no help to the Appellant here. The first of 
these is the case of 
Ravare vs. :McCormick and Company, 
166 Southern 183, (Louisiana, 1936). 
There the Louisiana Court refused to disturb the judg-
ment of the Trial Court, the trier of the fact, in assess-
ing damages in the first instance. In that case the 
damages were so 1nodest that when considered in the 
light of the jurisdiction it seems quite probable that the 
plain tiff was a Negro. 
The second case in this classification is 
Colonial Baking Con1pany vs. Acquino, 
103 S. W. 2nd 613 (Tennessee, 1936). 
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There were three plaintiffs there involved and in each 
of the three cases the Trial Court in the exercise of its 
discretion had suggested the re1nission of a part of the 
verdict as an alternative of the granting of a motion 
for new trial, and the Appellate Court refused to dis-
turb the exercise of the Trial Court's discretion. In 
this case the amounts of damages allowed by the Trial 
Court and affirmed by the Appellate Court are interest-
ing. The Trial Court allowed the first plaintiff, a woman, 
$15,000.00 for severe injuries to her head and chest, 
requiring months of painful treatment, the loss of all 
teeth and permanent disfigurement, and which rendered 
her neurotic and nervous. 
The second plaintiff, an eleven year old boy, suf-
fered a fractured leg and maimed hand which was ren-
dered practically useless: In the course of treatment the 
leg became infected and thereafter treatment involved 
keeping the leg in traction for a month, both of which 
caused great suffering. The Trial Court suggested a 
reduction of $5,000.00 in a $15,000.00 verdict and the 
Appellate Court refused to disturb this exercise of 
discretion. The third plaintiff was the husband of the 
first and the jury awarded hiln a verdict of $10,000.00 
for loss of service of his wife and for n1edical damage. 
The proved medical damage amounted to $3,046, in<'lud-
ing an estimate of $500.00 for future medical treatmenl 
The Court noted that the wife had resumed her work 
in her husband's shop and noted that during her irwapae-
ity a substitute had been hired to work in the shop for 
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$540.00 and further observed that under these circum-
stances future loss of service was highly speculative. 
It approved the Trial Court's suggested reduction to a 
total of $5,000 for medical expense and loss of service. 
The Appellate Court in this case held that the Trial 
Court had properly exercised its discretion but that there 
was no error in refusing further to reduce these verdicts. 
It is to be noticed that this case was decided in 1936 in 
the depths of the depression and that the amounts 
approved were then the equivalent of double the amount 
in our present inflated currency so that the damages 
approved by the court for injuries to the wife, which 
were apparently less serious than the injuries in the · 
case at Bar, were better than 2¥2 times the amount of 
the verdict here for Irene Paul's general damages. 
Thirdly, in all of the above cases except the Colonial 
Baking Company case last considered, and in the addi-
tional cases mentioned in this sub-section of our brief, 
it must be noted that the Appellate Courts considered 
the question of damages without any reference whatso-
ever to the problern of passion or prejudice of the jury 
and it is apparent fron1 the decisions that under the 
rules or statutes there being administered, the court was 
not required to find passion or prejudice of the jury 
before the court was entitled to intervene. This is, of 
course, not the case in Utah. In addition to the cases 
above considered, as aforesaid, the cases of 
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and 
and 
Missouri Pacific Transportation Con1pany 
vs. Socker, 
138 S. W. 2nd 371 (Arkansas, 1940), 
Ca:rlballal vs. Pilgrin1 Laundry, Inc. 
5 N.Y.S. 2nd 38, 18 N.E. 2nd 44 (1938). 
Duncan vs. Branson, 
110 Pac. 2nd 789 (Kansas, 1941), 
fall in this classification. They are clearly distinguish-
able on this ground from the case at Bar and are of no 
help to the Appellant. 
In the Carballal case it is also interesting to note 
that during the depression the court left the verdict at 
$15,000.00 for personal injuries to 3: 5lj2 year old child 
and at $;3,000.00 for her Father's loss of her services. 
T.hese verdicts are obviously the equivalent of $25,000 
to $30,000 and $5,000 to $6,000 in the present inflated 
currency. 
In the case of 
O'Brian vs. J. I. Case Cmnpany, 
2 N. W. 2nd"107 (Nebraska, Jan. 1942), 
the jury awarded $10,000 for a contusion or bruise of 
the periostium of the right middle eolldyl<>, a bone in the 
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right elbow, which caused considerable pain, and a 372 
inch cut just below the hairline of the right brow which 
resulted in a pennanent scar. Undisputed n1edical testi-
mony was that the elbow would becon1e normal and some 
other scars which had been sustained would diminish 
with lapse of time. The plaintiff had received n1oderate 
shock and anen1ia and she complained of headache, elbow 
pain and irritability, but she lost no wages and was 
not disabled frmn and could still perform the duties of 
her employment. For these relatively slight injuries 
the court held that $10,000 was excessive and manifestly 
resulted fro1n passion and prejudice so that a new trial 
should have been granted. The tremendous difference 
in 'the severity and duration of the injuries between that 
case and the case at Bar makes the1n readily distinguish-
able on the facts. 
Finally it should be observed that all of the cases 
cited by Appellant were decided before the presently 
existing inflation occurred and if the verdicts which 
were approved by the court were to be translated into 
inflated dollars of present value, most of them would 
tend to support the Respondents' position here. None 
of the cases ·are authority for the position advocated by 
the Appellant in the case at Bar. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is very respectfully submitted first, 
that the Appellant's brief fails to state any grounds 
upon which this court can grant him any relief and sec-
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ondly, that when the various presumptions to which the 
verdict and the trial court's order refused a new trial 
are entitled and considered, the verdicts complained of 
are not at all excessive, but on the contrary are very 
modest, and that the judgn1ent must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER of 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GL~-\SS;\L\J\ 
Attorneys-at-law 
1018 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
MILO V. OLSON, Esquire, 
of the California Bar 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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